

# IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONVERGENCE AND MINDSET OF ORGANISED CRIME AND TERRORISM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF NIGERIA

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## **Abstract**

The concern of this study points to the convergence position of terrorism and organised crime, the mindset of perpetrators, and their effect on national security. However, in recent times, actual or expected convergence studies have increasingly been blurred within 20th-century geopolitics. Against this background, the study examines the attributes and mindsets shared by organized criminals and terrorist groups, reveals the convergence area, and unveils their implications for national security. The paper enjoys qualitative data such as books, journals, and periodicals. We anchored the article on social movements and relative deprivation as its theoretical orientation. The findings stress the convergence between organised criminals and terrorist groups in their methods of operations such as trafficking, kidnapping, drugs, illegal trading activities, theft and armed banditry, forgery, and forging of documents, terrorist imitation of the organised criminal behaviour, among others. The paper recommend, among other things, that the government and other well-meaning individuals in Nigeria should be mindful of the attributes, characteristics, and mindset of organised criminals and terrorist groups. To this effect, give an intelligence report to the government for pro-active actions against criminals of the state.

**Keywords:** Organised Crime, Terrorism, Convergence, Mind-Set, National Security

## **Introduction**

The distinction between organised crime and terrorist organisations is no doubt. There have always been a sharp division between the two (Laqueur, 1999, p. 14). However, recent events and incidents have shown that the fault line separating terrorism and organised crime has become increasingly blurred. The point of emphasis is that studies of the actual or potential convergence between terrorist activity and organised crime have become a growing trend within the geopolitical framework of the 20th century (Makarenko 2004, pp. 129-145). Two factors are critical and may be responsible for this convergence. First is that the increase in anti-terrorist laws and the global distaste for terrorism and terrorist acts. Following the 9/11 incident have drastically reduced states' willingness to sponsor terrorist acts and groups to some extent and hence drastically reduced their sources of funds and means of financing their

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operations. Besides this, the globalisation of the world economy, which to the consequent emergence of transnational forms of organised criminality and money laundering, has eased considerably the possibilities of terrorists becoming involved in illegal businesses and money laundering (Sanderson, 2004, pp. 49–61).

### **Theoretical Postulations**

This paper anchored its theoretical trajectories and postulations on two related theoretical frameworks – social movements and relative deprivation. This is to concede that we see organised crime and terrorism as social movements by people who had suffered some form of deprivations but without means to express or give vents to their grievances or meet these deprived needs without resorting to extra-judicial or illegal means. Basically, social movements are unique and distinct from other social forms primarily because they (1) exist outside of the institutional framework of everyday life, and (2) are in some ways oriented towards a degree of social change (Hannigan, 1985, p. 437). As Barnes (1995, p. 151) has noted, social movements are conventionally distinguished from political parties and pressure groups. This is because they operate, not as political parties and pressure groups do through politics, but by the direct mobilisation of opposition to what goes on within the channels of politics. Thus, deriving from Wood and Jackson (1982, p. 25) and as Harper (1993, p. 140) “social movements are unconventional collectivities with varying degrees of organisation that attempt to promote or prevent change.” The term ‘collectivity’ is preferred in the case of social movements, instead of the common term ‘group.’ This is basically because the former helps to emphasise and drive home a major characteristic of social movements as they are only partly organised social phenomenon. Thus, by the word ‘collectivity’, social movements are a collection of people that are not structured along any organisational line or as structured as groups. Gerlach and Hine (1970, p. 13) have identified certain characteristics of social movements that make them different from other organisations:

1. They have ‘segmental organisations’ that compete for loyalties of adherents in what can be described as a multi-organisational field.
2. Social movements are characterized by face-to-face recruitment in small groups.
3. Members participation is usually motivated by a high level of commitment to the cause rather than by external rewards such as money or other extrinsic rewards.
4. Over time, a social movement develops ideologies that serve as a rally point for mobilising members and articulating their rationales, goals, and causes.
5. Whether real or perceived, social movements need opposition that will provide impetus, direction, and external pressure that helps create and cement needed solidarity within the movement.

In this case, both religious and political social movements seem to thrive on an image of an opposing evil and villain. Such as the government or other movements, ethnic or tribes opposed to their cause.

Ted Gurr's (1971, p. 13) relative deprivation theory states that "the greater the discrepancy, between what is sought for and what seems attainable, the greater the chances that anger and violence will result". He defined relative deprivation as "a perceived discrepancy between men's value expectations and their value capabilities" (p. 25). Scholars that favoured this explanation have argued that absolute deprivation is a motivating force that has led to the emergence of social movements (Toch, 1965; Fanon, 1968). In this case, absolute deprivation means the prevalence and presence of such situations as hunger, illness, lack of safety, and other material deprivations, which bring people close to the minimal conditions of survival. The analysts sympathetic to this explanation equally postulated that changes in objective social needs such as extreme poverty and rises in food prices are causes of collective behaviour and social movements. However, empirical evidence has shown that absolute deprivation has not usually produce social movements, especially in areas where such absolute deprivation is common. Also, empirical evidence has equally shown that even where social movements emerged, such movements are not directed at alleviating the absolute deprivation. Therefore, this led to a reformulation of this theory and the rejection of objective conditions or deprivations as an explanation for the origins of social movements. Rather, scholars such as Davies (1969,p.11) and Gurr (1971,p.26) argue that relative deprivation (subjective deprivation) is what presents the social-psychological condition underlying the emergence of movements. Thus, relative deprivation exists when there is a significant gap between values expectation and value outcomes, or put in another way, between what people expect and what they get. This theory has to do with the subjective feelings of being deprived relative to what others have or what they expected to have. The import of this theory is the existence of a reference group which is the source of such expectation and against which the individuals deprived can measure their levels of deprivation and expectation. This means that the feeling of deprivation comes when people compare their condition with the relevant categories of others.

Thus, relative deprivation provides answers to (1) why protest movements are often common during periods of sustained improvement in objective conditions (expectations rise faster) and (2) why people involved in movements are often not the most "objectively" deprived people (Harper, 1993, p. 146). Thus, "this approach focuses on the relative deprivation between groups. ...groups can be reasonably well off in terms of wealth, power and prestige, yet still feel deprived relative to other groups. The underprivileged groups are likely to protest" (Wood and Jackson, 1982, p. 37). However, there is no sufficient evidence that empirical findings support this approach. Deriving from studies from the 1960s, McPhail (1971, p. 106) has concluded that "there is an important reason for rejecting the notion that relative deprivation and ensuing frustration ...is the root cause of rebellion". This may be the case when instances from developed Western nations are investigated. Still, in Africa, there are pieces of

evidence to support the fact that relative deprivation and the feelings of alienation it engendered has led to more conflicts than any other single cause (Agara, 2012, Francis, 2011, Furley, 1995). Notwithstanding, relative deprivation theory offers scholars some advantages in explaining the origins of social movements, such as (1) it is conceptually more precise than older arguments about mass discontent, (2) it does not involve a derogatory view of participants as riff-raff enraptured by the irrationalities of mob actions, (3) it is the view as having some utility when combined with other approaches, but on its own, it is not as a necessary or complete explanation of the origins of social movements (Gurney and Tierney, 1982. Wood and Jackson, 1982).

### **The Nature and Nexus of the Convergence of Organised Crime**

Although no common acceptable definition of organised crime, Cressey's (1969, p. 319) definition was adopted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for many decades. Cressey's defined organised crime as "any crime committed by a person or group of persons occupying, in an established division of labour, a position designed for the commission of crimes providing that such division of labour includes at least one position for a corrupter, one position for a corruptee and one position for an enforcer." A new definition was muted at a 1998 international conference in Warsaw. They see organised crime as "activities of three or more persons, with hierarchical links or personal relationships, which permit their leaders to earn profits or control territories or markets, internal or foreign, using violence, intimidation, or corruption, both in furtherance of criminal activity and to infiltrate the legitimate economy."

On the other hand, terrorism following Laqueur's (2003) recognition that there are "many terrorists" (narcotic, cyber, biological and internet). Like organised crime, terrorism has had a long history of thought that informs and motivates the practice, dating back to antiquity. Hence, a single sentence definition may be inadequate to capture the concept. However, dating from antiquity is the philosophical justification from the periods of the ancient Greek philosophers Plato (429-347 BC) and Aristotle (384-322 BC), who discussed the question and morality of *tyrannicide* (that is, the killing of a despotic or evil ruler) in the *Republic* and *Politics, respectively*. Also dating from antiquity is the association between terrorism and religion. Religious groups are known to carry out terrorist acts. In particular, a group called the *Sicarii* made up of a highly organised religious sect, the Zealot, known for their anti-Roman struggle in Palestine (AD 66-73). However, with the French Revolution and the Jacobin Reign of Terror (1792-94), dated the beginning of modern use of the word 'terrorism.'

Thus, as Pettiford and Harding (2010, p. 35) have noted, "it is with the 19th century that terrorism arrives first as a word, but then in what we might term 'recognisable' form." Laqueur (1979, p. 117) had noted that "from the turn of the century to the 1960s, terrorism (became) the preserve of nationalist-separatist social movements." But as Sinai (2010/2011, p. 2) has noted, the most fundamental starting point in terrorism studies is how to define it. While not wanting to join in the definitional polemics and controversies, we shall

acknowledge that there are two definitions; academic and institutional explanations. An example of an institutional or official report is the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) sees terrorism as “the unlawful application of force, violence against persons or property, intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives”. An example of an academic definition is that of Ganor (2005, p. 17), who defines it as “a form of violent struggle in which violence is deliberately used against innocent civilians to achieve political goals (nationalistic, socioeconomic, ideological, religious among others).” He further explained that the use of ‘deliberate’ in targeting civilians to achieve political objectives distinguishes a terrorist act from a purely guerrilla warfare where military targets are the major focus of their operations. The controversies in definition notwithstanding, for any definition of terrorism to be acceptable, it must, at least, include these six major elements; (1) the use of violence or threat of violence, (2) the existence of an organised group, (3) the intention of achieving a political objective, (4) the focus of violence must be a targeted audience that extends beyond the immediate victims who are often innocent civilians (usually account for as collateral damage), (5) in this case, the government can be either the perpetrator or the target, and finally, (6) it is a form of insurgency usually favoured by the weak (Lutz and Lutz 2008, p. 9).

The definitional confusions, notwithstanding, specific attributes of organised crime have been identified by Abadinsky (2010, p. 3) and it is against these that we shall compare terrorist organisations to draw out the convergence. As Abadinsky (2010, p. 3) has claimed, these “attributes provide a basis for determining if a particular group of criminals constitutes an organised crime. Therefore, it needs to be approached in a way different from the way one would approach terrorists or groups of conventional criminals” Abadinsky (2010), therefore, identified the main attributes of organised crime as:

1. No political goals.
  2. Hierarchical order.
  3. Has a limited and exclusive membership.
  4. Constitutes unique culture.
  5. Perpetuates and reproduced itself.
  6. Exhibits a willingness to use illegal violence.
  7. Monopolistic.
  8. Governed by explicit rules and regulations.
- **No political goals:** The primary purpose of all organised criminal enterprise is to make money and plenty of it. This include having the power that money gives but whose procurement is not limited by legal or moral concerns. Criminals are not motivated by social doctrine, political beliefs or ideological considerations. If any, political involvement is to further secure political patronage by politicians and gain protection or immunity for its illegal activities. Concerning terrorist groups, there is a need to distinguish between political terrorism (that is, those groups that have political goals) and

religious terrorism (whose concern is primarily eschatological). This distinction is important because for a terrorist action to qualify as politically motivated, it must “challenge the state but affect no private rights of innocent parties” (Kittrie, 1981, p. 300).

Thus, religiously motivated terrorism differs from its politically motivated counterpart. In contrast, political terrorism attempts to find a resolution within the lifetimes of the perpetrators, and religious terrorism outlives its participants. This is linked on the belief that the rewards of those involved in this cause are trans-temporal. They are making the time limit of their struggle eternity. The second is that targets of religious terrorism are not chosen for their military values. Instead, they are selected for the sole purpose of impacting public consciousness both by their brutality and suddenness. Thirdly, the constant recourse to a ‘god’ to justify their action has the power of ‘satanism’ on the enemies while making the perpetrators of religious terrorism ‘godly’ and their goal nobler than mere secular pursuits of political ends. As Juergensmeyer (2004, pp. 34-38) had noted, this is a kind of “perverse performance of power meant to ennoble the perpetrators’ views of the world while drawing viewers into their notions of cosmic war”. As he had also noted, the effect of this is “not so much that religion has become politicised but that politics has become religionised. Through enduring absolutism, worldly struggles have been lifted into the high proscenium; of sacred battles.”

Again, religious terrorism and violence targets also assume a similar religious mien, explanation and perspective. For instance, following the 9/11 attacks, the then US President, George Bush whipped up national sentiments when he invoked the ‘religious image’ of America’s “righteous cause” as combating and bringing “absolute evil” of its enemies to an end. More so, the ‘divine’ nature of religious terrorism, believing that the war is between ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘truth’ and ‘evil’, with the expectation of heavenly rewards for the terrorists all rule out the possibility of a compromise or a peaceful resolution. Sixth, the spiritual dimension of the war makes it go beyond the confines of human law and morality. Society’s law are subordinated and, in extreme cases, are deemed non-existent or inapplicable because of the recourse to a higher authority. The belief and perception here are that society’s laws and limitations are irrelevant when one obeys a higher ‘divine’ authority. Seventh and finally, the result of religious terrorism is that it impacts a sense of redemption and dignity on the perpetrators. At this level, religious terrorism acquires a personal willingness of the perpetrators, who frequently are men who feel alienated and marginalised from public life (Agara & Ogwola, 2014, p.6).

Thus, criminal enterprise and religious terrorism share a similar affinity of ‘apoliticalness.’ This is despite Ayatollah Khomeini’s claim that “Islam is politics or it is nothing” (Lewis, 2003, pp.7-8). However, experience has shown that a group with political or ideological goals may consider its mission accomplished and no longer relevant. Rather than disband, it can mutate or transform into an organized criminal group. Several examples

abound of ex-militant groups and members transforming into criminal groups, particularly when they find personal and monetary goals outweighing ideology or political reasons and often drift across the amorphous divide between politics and organised crime.

- **Organisational Structure:** An organised criminal enterprise structure does not follow the usual horizontal structure. Rather, it has a vertical power structure with the position of the leader delineated, with authority inherent in the position and not depending on who the occupant is at any given time. As Abadinsky (2010, p. 202), has compared and noted, the structure of the African organised criminal organisation is not anything like that of the Sicilian Mafia or the Japanese yakuza organised criminal syndicates. But more like that of the Russian organised crime, which is fashioned and designed along project-based cells, organised along kinship, ethnic or clan lines. The structure is somehow fluid and flexible, not permanent such that on completion of an operation, members can disperse to reconvene or regroup at a later date for another function. Within the African organised crime syndicates, religious rituals (swearing before a shrine, covenants, oath-taking, etc.) are used to reinforce solidarity and loyalty further. At the same time, each member brings particular skills to the organisation.

The cell-like organisational structure comprises a few members (usually no more than ten), ensuring that each cell can operate independently. Members of one cell are not familiar with members of the other cells. However, they may be aware of the presence and areas of geographical operations. Hence, many features of a formal bureaucratic organisational structure are impractical to criminal organisations because they are primarily concerned with the possibility that security agencies can monitor their communications. Thus, while telephone communications are kept to the minimum, written communication is avoided, and information and orders, money, and other goods are transmitted face-to-face. Lengthy chains of command, characteristic of bureaucratic structure, are shunned by organised crime, limiting the span of control, making each cell virtually autonomous. According to Albin (1971, p.13), decentralisation in a criminal organisation is advantageous for business and security. In a bureaucratic structure, all necessary to hinder such an organisation would be to remove its top echelon. But when the syndicate's power structure is amorphous, what would have been done would be to have merely severe such a person from his position as a patron to his clients. The result is that another person fills the position, assumes the role, and develops his clients.

- **Limited or exclusive membership:** Membership into organised groups and terrorist organisations are never advertised or announced, nor are written applications invited with applicants shortlisted for interview. The membership is also exclusive by their exclusivity, not open, but significantly limited with strict qualification or criteria. Such as ethnic background (as in the case of the Fulani Herdsmen who were predominantly of the Fulani stock (Ishaku, 2018,p,5), kinship, race, criminal record, religious affiliation

(particularly in the case of religious terrorism like the ISIS, al-Qaeda and Boko Haram). Apart from meeting the basic qualifications, potential members would also require to be sponsored by a high-ranking member of the group and must prove qualified by their willingness to perform any acts required of them, obey orders and keep secrets.

As Abadinsky (2010, p. 4) has noted, the attractiveness and appeal of such groups can be seen by the steady stream of and availability of recruits desiring membership and access to such organisations. In some groups, members are expected to go through gruesome initiation rites. Although, in the case of ISIS, membership is a little less restricting with the influx of European non-Muslim youths joining the ranks and been recruited through the internet. However, their access is strictly limited to that of foot soldiers. They may not be admitted to the higher echelon until they prove their loyalty and commitment by carrying out certain atrocious actions that show their commitment to the cause. This is to guard against infiltration by secret agents of counter-terrorist groups. In both organisations, there are usually periods of apprenticeship, which may range from several months to several years. In the case of terrorist organisations, this period is used in training the new members in the 'art of war' such as bomb-making, weapons training and the likes in camps located in Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey and Pakistans, hilly and mountainous areas constantly bombed by allied drones led by the United States.

Of importance here is what Ben-Dor and Pedahzur (2005, p. 77) have called the 'totalistic' attribute of Islam. As a religion, Islam demands total adherence from its believers. Deriving from the above historical excursion, Islam could be seen not merely as a religion but as a total civilisation encompassing both the secular and the religious and every aspect of life of the individual as well as the community. A Muslim in Saudi Arabia is taking as one with any other Muslim from any other part of the world. The bonds that bind them all together are religion, even when they are of different nationalities. This makes it easier for Muslims to refer to their opponents not in territorial or national terms but simply as infidels (*kafirs*). Similarly, Muslims never referred to one another as Arabs or Pakistan or Nigerian, they simply identified themselves by their religion.

This perspective helps explain why, for instance, Pakistan is concerned with the Taliban and their successors in Afghanistan. For instance, the Taliban could fund religious insurrections and violence in Nigeria and Saudi Arabia would want to finance an Islamic bank in Nigeria. Conversely, an Afghanistan or Turk or Nigerian identified by his religion would be a natural ally to a Muslim in Nigeria and other parts of the world. As Lewis (2003) has noted; " Grouping based on religion in the modern world may seem anachronistic and even absurd. It is neither anachronistic nor absurd in relation to Islam." Thus, Islam is not only a matter of faith and practice, it is also an identity and loyalty that transcends all others. While they separate secular politics and religious piety in other nations, there is no such



separation in the Muslim countries. Both religious truth and political power are indissolubly associated; the first sanctified the second, the second sustained the first.

- *Constitutes a unique subculture:* The terms 'underworld' and 'secret organisations' best captured members' views, making them see themselves as distinct from society. They often view members of the larger society with disdain and contempt because they see themselves as above it and hence, not subject to the rules and laws governing conduct within such societies. As Agara (2013,p.12) had earlier noted, religious terrorism greatly differs from secular terrorism basically because they are predicated on different value systems, mode of justification and legitimacy for their actions rests on a different concept of morality, belief systems and world view. While for the secular terrorist, terrorism becomes a means to an end, for the religious terrorist, terrorism is an end in itself. Violence, therefore, becomes a sacred instrument or means to achieve a divine duty in response to a divine imperative. They are not guided by any man-imposed political or social imperatives but see their acts as a sacramental duty with transcendental dimension expedients for the attainment of their goals.

This partly explains why religiously motivated acts of terrorism are more dangerous and fatal than the less relatively more discriminating violence perpetrated by secular terrorists. This is guided by a perception that sees themselves; religious terrorists, not as 'insiders' or members of the system, but as 'outsiders' seeking to effect fundamental changes in the existing order along certain doctrinal lines, the religious terrorist has a high sense of responsibility coupled with a sense of alienation that enables him to distance himself from the victims of his atrocities and thus able to contemplate ever more destructive means of expressing his cruel acts. This explains the rhetoric common in the vocabulary of such demagogues denigrating and dehumanising their victims in terms such as 'infidels,' 'dogs,' 'children of satan,' and many others. The deliberate use of such terms justifies the act violence since the victims are not seen or regarded as human beings and justifies and erodes very form of constraints on violence and emboldens the perpetrators.

- *Perpetuates itself:* Both organised crime and terrorist organisations constitute an ongoing criminal conspiracy against the society but designed to persist through time and even after and beyond the lifetimes of the present members. It is this aura of persistence and permanence that provides the attraction and an important basis for attracting memberships to the groups and hence perpetuating its continued existence. Cressey (1969, p. 263) has noted concerning organised crime that to survive, it must have "an institutionalised process for inducting and sustaining new members and inculcating them with the values and ways of behaving of the social system." The same can be said of terrorist organisations also. As Agara et al (2017) have noted, "while the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) may be credited with the internationalisation of politically-motivated terrorism, at least the ethno-national political dimension of it, the Al Qaeda could be credited with internationalising the religious dimension."

Today, the emergence of many 'al-Qaedas' has made religious terrorism a vast enterprise, "an international movement or franchise operation with like-minded local representatives, loosely connected to a central ideological or motivational base, but advancing their common goal independently of one another" (Hoffman, 2007, pp. 2005-2006). Al-Qaeda is reportedly to have 'cells;' operational bases in Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Turkey, Jordan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Syria, Xinjiang in China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Myanmar, Indonesia, Mindanao in the Philippines, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Yemen, Libya, Tunisia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Dagestan, Kashmir, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Azerbaijan, Eritrea, Uganda, Ethiopia and the West Bank and Gaza in Palestinian areas of Israel (Perlmutter, 2004).

- **Willingness to use illegal violence:** A distinguishing factor of both organised crime and terrorist groups is their willingness to use violence in pursuit of their goals. Their use of violence is not restricted by moral or ethical considerations, but is controlled only by practical limitations. In Islamic religious terrorism, violence is an integral aspect of its fundamentalism. As Agara and Ogwola (2014, p.24) have noted, according to the Muslim tradition, the world is divided into two axis; War (*Dar al-Harb*) and Islam (*Dar al-Islam*). In the place of Islam the Muslim governments rule with Islamic laws and principles having no need for a jihad, but in the axis of War, the world is ruled and governed by infidels making jihad an obligation. The proposition here is that jihad becomes a continuous duty until the whole world has accepted the Muslim faith.

An emerging dimension to the use of violence is the inclusion of female terrorists and the recourse to suicide bombings. Elsewhere, we have fully interrogated these twin phenomena (Agara, 2015, 2016, p.34; Agara & Onimawo, 2018, p.23). One of the tragic aspects of modern terrorism but which seems to be gaining ground in popularity is suicide bombers. Going by the numbers of successful operations and the dexterity of the bombers, it would seem that the Boko Haram religious terrorists in Nigeria specially favoured this type of technique. However, modern day phenomenon of suicide bombers has its root in the earlier version of the use of assassins who constituted a religious sect in Islam. Suicide is easy to conceptualise as the willful and deliberate taking of one's life as a result of some perceived reason or cause, what Gere (2007, p. 363) has called "homicidal self-sacrifice."

According to Jane's Intelligence Review, "suicide terrorism has to do with sacrificing one's life in destroying a target to advance a political goal or goals. The aim of the psychologically and physically war-trained terrorist is to die while destroying the enemy's target." As Gere (2007, p. 363) had pointed out, the use of suicide bombers occur in two contexts: in declared open war in which regular combatants are involved, targeting other uniformed enemy soldiers, equipment and installation; and in undeclared conflicts which can be civil, ethnic or religious in nature. Thus, it becomes important to distinguish between wartime suicide operations made popular by the Japanese kamikaze during World War II and terrorist suicide

operations such as those carried out by Palestinian Islamist organisations and made more desirable by Al Qaeda. Patkin (2007, p. 170) has defined suicide bombing as “a bomb attack on either people or property or both delivered by a person who knows the explosion will cause his or her death.”

The irony of female suicide bombers is that in radical Islam, women’s status as subordinate is fundamental and rigorously maintained; they are considered as unclean, they must be kept hidden and their bodies covered and made subordinate to men (Elshtain, 2003), so the few that have bridged the societal norms by appearing in public are better used as cannon fodder, explosive baggage or suicide bomber. It is a general irony to note that the leaders of terrorist movements who urge others to give their lives in pursuit of the goal of the movement usually have their children not been involved in suicide missions but kept far away from the trauma and danger of the intifada. The female suicide bomber becomes a victim in the midst of what she considers the most empowered act of her life; even at death, she cannot escape from the stigma of her sex as a woman imposed on her by the religion which now places demands on her life. Thus, in a society that restricts options and opportunities available for women, where children at early age are socialised into terror and where martyrs attain the status of celebrities, where daily life is fraught with endless examples of humiliation and deprivation in a culture where honour has historically been among the most salient values, where religious leaders provide the most elaborate theological justification for martyrdom, it should be no surprise then that there will be endless volunteers among young people, both male and female, for martyrdom.

- **Monopolistic:** Every criminal organisation lays claim to particular territories to which it eschews competition but rather establish hegemonic control over. This hegemony could be over a metropolitan area or section, a particular ‘industry’ (such as gambling, trucking, drug, prostitution, protection racketing or/and loans harking or a combination of these). This monopoly is maintained and sustained through violence or by threat of violence or through corrupt relationships with government officials. The hegemony is enforced by the use of both methods – violence and support by corrupt officials. Because of the existence of opposing groups interested in carving into the territorial claims of other groups, violence becomes an unending possibility. However, territoriality is more closely associated with localness rather than the broad reach of transnational criminal organisations (Reuter and Petrie 1999, p.34). In the case of political terrorist organisations, similar concerns of territoriality are important. Such groups operate within a defined territory or geographical area where their influence and political goals can be realized. But for religious terrorism, the 9/11 incidents have internationalised them and so are transnational with ‘cells’ in virtually all areas of the globe. Bin Laden’s declaration of a jihad against United States in 1998 through a fatwa, calling on all Muslims to “kill Americans, military and civilian and plunder their money” (Migaux, 2007, p. 315), has led to the creation of many networks and extremist movements in Bangladesh,

Pakistan, Kuwait and even in far remote areas such as Nigeria, Sudan, Kenya and other countries. These various networks were able to draw inspiration from Al Qaeda's activities, and by so doing justified their own local actions as belonging to a worldwide body of insurrections against infidels (Agara et al, 2017,p.45). In Nigeria, for instance, the Taliban (students of religion) connection to many of the religious terrorists' attacks has not been denied.

- ***Governed by rule and regulations:*** Like all legitimate multi-layered organisations, organised crime is governed by strict rules and regulations that not only governed behaviour and relationships between and amongst members but which members are expected to follow. Contravening any of these rules may lead to an outright death sentence, or as Abadinsky (2010, p. 5) puts it, "a rule-violating member is not fired but, more likely, fired upon." Among terrorist groups, similar rules and regulations exist which inspired a code of silence and denial even under torture. However, a way of ensuring this silence is that information is shared on the 'need to know basis only. Information is shared only at segmented level where no one operative or person has the full information except the leader and perhaps a few trusted lieutenants. Thus, each operative knows in part (only the aspect of the operation that concerns him or his cell) and not in full. This is assured by the cell organisational structure they adopted which further reinforces security by providing a significant degree of separation between the leadership and the operatives

### **Understanding the Mind-set**

Several opinions and questions have always been asked concerning the mindset of terrorists in particular. What kind of person becomes a terrorist? Conversely, what kind of people cherish organised criminality? What kind of people will obsessively rejoice in the destruction and killing of other people? Are they religious fanatics or ideologues? Is there even any way to tell who would likely become a terrorist? All these questions are applicable to membership of organised crime. In particular, the last question concerns psychologists and sociologists, to identify the traits commonly related to willingness to join or become a terrorist or member of an organised criminal syndicate. It is accepted that if these traits can be identified, it then becomes possible to predict, identify, understand and hence prevent memberships into these groups. Hacker (1976, p. 8-9) has offered three categories of persons generally thought of as being members of these groups. They are the "crazies, criminals and crusaders." According to him, the 'crazies' "emotionally disturbed individuals who are driven to commit acts generally associated with criminality and terrorism by reasons of their own that often do not make sense to anybody else." The 'criminals' "perform acts for easily understood personal gains." These relegate the law of the society being in full control of their faculties and senses. Both their motives and goals can be clearly understood by everybody even though it is deplorable to us. The 'crusaders' commit terrorist acts not for personal gain. But ego and power for a collective cause." For instance they are like the

'crazies' their reasons for doing this are often unclear both to themselves and others, their ultimate goals are even frequently less understandable. They commit these acts because they believe that they are serving a higher cause.

The basic difference in the mindsets of these three types is very clear. For instance, the criminal does what he does with anticipation that he will live to enjoy the reward of his illegality whereas, the crusader will be more willing to blow himself up along with his targets or victims because their service carries the assurance of a greater reward in the hereafter. The crusader is always a well trained professional, disciplined, obedient and committed to the cause. They are not ready to negotiate any resolution because such action is viewed as a betrayal of the cause, and there is little the negotiator can offer because the crusader does not desire any personal gain, safe passage out of the situation. Their belief in the cause and justification of their action makes death not a penalty but a path to glory and a greater reward than can be offered here on earth by either the negotiator or government.

The search for a terrorist/criminal personality or mindset that would act as a common denominator is legitimate but may prove futile. However, this has not prevented profilers from embarking on this journey. As it relates to terrorists, O'Ballance (1979, pp. 300-301) has offered one of such profiles, by identifying specific features such as (1) Dedication which implies being a 'fedayeen', such as a man willing to sacrifice everything for the cause he believes in. Dedication also implies absolute loyalty and commitment to the leader of the group. To some extent, this characteristic may also be found among criminals only that most would not be ready to sacrifice everything. Among criminals, the option of plea bargaining has provided a soft landing for those who are ready to negotiate and betray others. (2) Personal vigour and bravery which includes the possibility of death, injury, imprisonment or even tortured. Among hardened criminals, similar traits can be seen. (3) Devoid of human emotional sentiment and pity or remorse. This is imperative because most of the victims of terrorist attacks are innocent victims; who are not related to the cause but who he must be prepared to kill without hesitation in pursuit of the cause and of course, similar traits can be seen even among criminals. (4) Fairly high standard of intelligence, many recruits into the terrorist group have above average western education. The leader of Boko Haram was a University graduate and Osama Bin Laden was an engineer trained by the Americans. This is necessary because they have to "collect, collate and assess information, devise and apply complex plans to evade police, security forces and other hostile forces" (Combs, 2003, p. 56). (5) Fairly high degree of sophistication. Terrorists need to mingle with the most sophisticated crowd without standing out. (6) Be reasonably well educated and possess a fair share of general knowledge. Characteristics 4, 5, and 6 are exhibited by members of organised crime, particularly in this age where a fairly large numbers of the memberships are unemployed graduates with access to the internet and other social media.

### **Implications of Organised Crime and Terrorism for National Security**

Security, according to Aisedion and Omoregie (2018, p.245), refers to the condition of being free from, or elimination of threat from the geographical space of the state, ability to protect the majority of its citizenry and provide a conducive environment for their general well-being. For a state to attract development, she must be free from susceptibility to harm, possess the capacity to terminate threat and have the ability to protect both boys and girls, men and women, old and young, poor and the rich and prioritise the provision of favourable atmosphere for individual's self-development. So when security is express to take care of everybody both the governed and those in authority controlling the machinery of the state, it can then be said that it is national. Furthermore, security according to Obasanjo cited in Ijoyah and Ndakotu (2021, p.175) is the safety of lives and property, economic, psychological, mental well-being and freedom to engage on lawful objectives without impediment.

So for security to be national, it must all be encompassing and must cover a broad spectrum of both military and non-military dimensions of security that positively affect the well-being of every citizen, both the poor and the rich, the ruled and the rulers in a country. Therefore the implication of organised crimes and terrorism for national security cannot be overemphasised as their impacts undermined people's quality of life and threaten their human security by limiting access to employment and educational opportunities, institute wide spread corruption and money laundering in Nigeria. They manifest violent conflicts over resources and incapacitate the state in taking physical control of its territory, loss of monopoly on the legitimate use of force, erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions, inability of the state to provide reasonable public services, institutional corruption, criminality, strengthened the inability of a government to regulate the economy and collect taxes, huge internally displacement of citizens, sharp economic decline, ethnic and religious violence, humanitarian disaster and spread of dangerous weapons (Kinnan et al., 2011, p.21). They equally manifest widespread social denial such as lack, joblessness, illiteracy, physical and mental impairments, high unhealthy state of mind and death rates; absence of social services such as education, health care, housing. They also have deterioration effect on infrastructure and public utilities such as electricity, potable water, and road and rail linkages. The effects of organised crime of corruption, drug trafficking, oil theft (bunkering) and money laundering are devastating (Alemika, 2013, p.21).

The destruction of human capital, destruction of valuable property and government strategic installations, by suicide bombers who are aided by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons are grievous threat to national security. These crimes present huge challenges to the rule of law, economic and social development, and the protection of human rights and security. Organised crime aggravate conflict by funding or resourcing armed groups such as the Boko Haram insurgency, Fulani herders, cattle rustlers, and separatist movements.

The security agencies have been overwhelmed by organised criminals and terrorist groups, as hundreds and thousands of the military have paid supreme

prices defending the nation. The government is distracted from the development of the state as funds are diverted for the procurement of military weapons to counter organised criminals and terrorist groups. The possession of the use of weapons by terrorist groups for gruesome killing of both civilians, security agencies have significantly affected the economic, political, social, religious activities and undermined the sovereignty of the state. Terrorist and organised crimes are the biggest challenges affecting Nigeria, the challenges have continued to pose a serious threat to human productivity. Human beings are agent of development the death of one is a colossal loss to national development as manpower or labour force of the country are depleted (Aisedion and Omoregie, 2018,p. 21). Organised crime has sabotaged the economy with illegal activities such as cigarettes, drugs and human trafficking, money laundering, among others resulting in tremendous loss of tax revenue affecting public safety, public health, democratic institutions, and economic stability across the state.

Terrorism has a significant challenge to the Nigerian government in recent times. This is because its activities employ intimidation of people, attacking of states, territories either by bombing, hijackings, and suicide attacks, among others. It implies a premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents. The nefarious activities of the Islamic sect (Boko Haram) have led to loss of lives and property in Nigeria. Some of these activities include bombing, suicide bomb attacks, sporadic shooting of unarmed and innocent citizens, burning of police stations, churches, kidnapping of school girls and women, destruction of oil facilities by Niger Delta militants alongside the attacks carried out by Fulani Herdsmen on some communities in the North and South. Nigeria has been included among one of the terrorist countries of the world where lives and property have been loss and a sizeable number of citizens rendered destitute and homeless. Families have loss their loved ones, many women are now widows, children become orphans with no hope of the future. The level of terrorism in Nigeria, both in the northern and southern part has become a major issue for the government. Since Boko Haram insurgents arose in the Northern part of the country, Nigeria has witnessed unprecedented security challenges. These challenges ranges from kidnapping, suicide attacks, bombings, assassinations, and this has led to the destruction of lives and property, hindered business activities, discouraged local and foreign investors, increases government expenditure on security, all of these stifles and retards Nigeria's socio-economic development (Obi, 2015, pp.11-12).

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

This work has been limited to only three aspects of the study-convergence; the structural attributes and mindsets of members of two organisations as well as their implications for national security. However, areas where the convergence is more explicit are mostly in the methods of their operations such as kidnapping, drug trafficking, illegal trading activities, theft and armed banditry, forging of documents, extortion for protection and creation of front or screen

companies to launder money (de la Corte, 2013; del la Corte & Gimenez-Salinas, 2013 and Gomez, 2010). Going by what Abadinsky (2010, p. 5) has muted that “in some cases, the terrorists imitate the organised criminal behaviour they see around them, borrowing techniques,” and this has led to more intimate connections, particularly in places where both groups exist together and in geographical areas riddled with poor governance, ethnic separatism, and where a tradition of criminal activity is prevalent such as found in failed states, war regions, prisons and some urban neighborhoods (Shelley and Picarelli, 2005).

However, this is not to pretend that there are still no areas of divergence, but to show that once terrorists and other criminal elements start to collaborate and cooperate with each other, buying and selling goods from each other, they eventually share each other’s goals as well as operational methods. In such a situation, the society, state, region is in great danger and insecurity becomes an issue and compromised. Nigeria faces a situation where criminal Fulani Herdsmen and Boko Haram are so into each other that it is even difficult for security agencies to identify which is which anymore. Their unwholesome and nefarious activities have undermined the sovereignty and the security of lives and property of the state. Nigeria is facing a herculean task battling with organised criminals and terrorist groups to guarantee a conducive atmosphere for her citizenry. This is because organised criminals and terrorist groups have devastating consequences on the Nigerian state. We recommend that the government and good-spirited individuals in Nigeria should be mindful of the attributes, characteristics, and mindset of organised criminals and terrorist groups in order to promptly give intelligent reports to the government for pro-active actions. Nigerian government should strengthen her institutions to tackle the menace of the dreadful groups. Also finds away to address the causes to make society free from insecurity. The government should embark on sensitisation to redefine the beliefs of the religious fanatics who carry obsessive confidence that whoever dies as a terrorist enjoys all the good things in heaven. The government needs to be responsive to the needs and aspirations of her citizens. Government should be pro-active in intelligent reports on issues relating to crimes and terrorist activities.

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