

The New World Order: A Clash of Perspectives

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Introduction

It is not the fact of different perspectives by itself that motivates this article. It is normal, and human too, to expect many perspectives on a common phenomenon, and they have' already been expressed bounteously. But we are warned about the possibility of what subsequent actions such divergence of perspectives might engender in the international system. Major powers such as all the G-7 (or at least some of them), whose actions inevitably have far-reaching implications for the world are involved. Entire regions are also involved or concerned where the mere number of their populations renders them very significant! Take for example the Third World or me South which has more than two-thirds ($2/3$) the world population: Though 'power'-less the way these regions look at the new world order and how that conditions their actions has great consequences on their populations. Or take Europe, traditionally held as the 'cockpit' of the world. How it sees, and how it operates in, the new world order is of great significance to the entire human race.

We are worried because since the break-up of the Soviet Union, a new world order (though evolved over a period) has been celebrated without waiting to contemplate what it holds for, or where it leads, humanly. Certainly the new world order is a 'defining moment,' according to Kegley,¹ a time when many minds, thoughts and actions can easily miss its' bearing. Wrong interpretations of signals may be a real danger, just as genuinely different perspectives may lead to inauspicious clashes where interests may not be different

In this essay, we can identify and focus on two main perspectives - the North perspective and the South perspective with their significant ramifications. For the North, it is possible to talk about the American (U.S.) and the European sub-divisions of their perspective - (the latter may broadly represent the non-U.S. A. view of the new world order), while for the South the perspective may be sub-divided into the enlightened and the unenlightened interpretation of the new world order. While we may not for now consider too seriously how much the Russian factor counts, we cannot completely ignore it.²

It will be naive to assume all is well in the North now that the Soviet Union is gone, with the cold war.³ We all can guess what it means for world peace and security should there be any violent disagreement or clash in the North. After all, if Europe alone could give us two world wars, an expanded North (which now includes the USA, Japan and Russia) may give us the 'mother of all wars' or war of the universe. For the South, one can hear discordant voices too. There seems to be an ambivalence or a dilemma regarding what relation to have with the developed world under these changed circumstances. For the same South that had wanted to be left alone (i.e. not to retain a relationship of exploitation and dominance such as they accused the North of) fears being left alone.⁴ Ironically this comes from the more articulate members of the South - what this writer considers the view of the enlightened. Yet there is one which sounds ridiculous and naive. This view, which with all modesty is held here as unenlightened, assumes that ideological differences are over for the world - gone with the Soviet Union. The discussants of this view-point (ironically found even on our university campuses) go on to suggest that what remains to choose from are the modes of capitalism to operate. Overwhelmed by the euphoria of capitalist triumph they hardly spare a moment to contemplate what role Russia or even Ukraine may assume in the new world order. The danger lies in the complacency to assume that in the new world order things shall come so easy, even for the

countries of the South. We intend to discuss these issues here and to point some alternatives yet overlooked or not very seriously considered.

The New World Order

Representing a conceptual model of the new world order is yet an uncertain business.

Thus, from the theoretical angle we are warned it might yet be too early to adjust our conceptual compasses.⁵ Two reasons account for this. The new trends and developments, while having not yet overthrown the dominance of power theory, have largely subverted that dominance. Kegley asks whether we are not rediscovering the Wilsonian legacy of idealism⁶ in international relations. For the thought provoking and incisive discourse that his paper represents, he has addressed some of the current issues in international politics, such as environment, multilateralism and transnationalisation, which, though not directly antithetical to power politics, do challenge its primacy. The form of interdependence and collective responsibility that these new realities engender largely preclude power as a prime factor for their pursuit. Rather, there is a more powerful assertion that we need such other, the weak end the strong to confront these new global problems. This has been a recurring theme in the report of the South Commission.⁷

In the same vein, Subramayam has emphasized the point that military force is no longer an instrument of politics. According to him, since the second world war (WWII) it has become impossible to occupy any territory by force if the local population resists it.⁸ And he further observes that 'the surrender of the East which is equal to a deideologization of foreign policy by Eastern powers and the recognition that war is no longer the viable instrument of politics constitute the pillars upon which the new structure of peace is being built.⁹ The former UNO Secretary General Javier Perez de Cueller of Venezuela holds a comparable view of what the world

order is leading to, providing another set of factors, He points to two major forces as being responsible for transforming the world, i.e. mass consciousness of rights and the explosion in communication technology. While the mass consciousness of rights makes the old inequities within and between societies unacceptable, the new communications technology has transformed the ways nations live and communicate with each other.¹⁰ His conclusion is (not surprisingly) similar to the South Commission's i.e. that "a world of interdependence called for a more tolerant and sensitive handling of its political, ideological or cultural diversities"¹¹. Many events in the new world order have been great spectacles themselves, such as the German reunification, discussions on the possible reunification of North and South Korea, the demise of apartheid, besides the ideological surrender of the Soviets.¹² Sewell and Melcher record the transformation, of the world Border thus:

The end of the cold war, the convergence of thinking on economic policy in the North and the South, the diffusion of economic strength among the United States and other major powers, and, above all, the growing differentiation within the South have profoundly changed the international political landscape.¹³

The observed trends and events all point to an emergent international system different from the old. Secondly, traditions die hard. The power theorists have their way of looking at the new world order. They are more structural in approach, and tend to think in terms of either unipolar, hegemonic, or multipolar or 'uni-multipolar' terms. Not surprisingly Americans are more inclined to seeing a transformation of the world order into a unipolar, unipolar, hegemonic one under the United States. That the US harbours hegemonic notions of the new world order is properly reported by Chomsky.¹⁴ And Leicester's article gives clear expression to the unipolar and multipolar or uni-multipolar conceptions.¹⁵ The suppositions of the unipolar or unipolar world are that since the cold war is over and since USSR which

headed the Eastern bloc in die bipolar system that prevailed is no more, the capitalist Western bloc naturally succeeds as the undisputed ideological hegemon of the world, which logic naturally installs the USA in the position of dominance. A variant of this is that despite the demise of the USSR, the world dissolves into many centres rather than consolidating into only one. Europe and Japan are thus considered alternatives to the USA. Logically, the power structure to look out for is a multipolar rather than a unipolar one from this viewpoint Thus, however we look at it from the power perspective, k is acknowledged that there has been a transformation of the international system m recent years, which perhaps has not yet ended.

The Views from the North

This focuses on the way the North sees itself and the way it sees the South. The hegemonic view is cherished by the Americans. As pointed out by Liecester, the economic imperative would require that the US assume a strong leadership role in the world a legacy of its cold war economy which emphasized military industrial economy.¹⁶

Chomsky interprets this to mean a need to have a capable defender of the capitalist, to protect its interests in the new world order. Thus, if the world needs any stability, "in the operative sense of the term, "stability" means security for the upper classes and large foreign enterprises" and it must naturally be preserved. These "are crucial features of the old world order, well documented in the internal record, regularly illustrated in historical practice bound to persist as contingencies change."¹⁷ In the setup, each region or section of the world community is assigned its role. The South to supply raw materials, the other members of the "rich men's club" must also allow order to reign, which is managed by the USA, the only power" with global interests and responsibilities.¹⁸

The USA is on top. And the idea of a unipolar world with the US providing the "uni" is well put by Miller

At this point in history, there is but one center - the United States. The United States stands alone in both global reach and influence, dominant and seemingly more able to impose its will than at any period in its history."¹⁹ He goes on to assert later, "America is not just another country, it is the center of power in a world looking for moral, political and military leadership".²⁰ (my emphasis). And Admiral Howe, though advocating a leadership role for the US ends up painting a picture of dominance by her.²¹ And Liecester's views may not differ much from general European opinion, that the USA suffers the problem of reconciling with a leadership role rather than a dominant one in the new world system.²²

There is no doubt that the US public opinion resists the idea of the USA as policeman of the world. True American political tradition is such that the public cannot be ignored. But when the chips are down, it is the powerful elite opinion that matters most in her foreign policy. And there are tempting grounds to be so inclined among the elite. For political economic reasons alone (which may not be voiced so directly by any American) what does the US get in return for all the years of sweat and blood leading the West against the Soviet Union? Reaping the benefits of that leadership in a world without the USSR naturally bestows dominating rights upon the US. This scenario comes neat when other things, being unequal, are disregarded. Secondly, the economic argument is powerful. What becomes of the huge military industrial establishment that the USA has put together without any immediate discernible role, without a Soviet Union? A whole volume of the Fletcher Forum was devoted to a debate by the professionals on what relevant role can now be contrived for the armed forces of the USA in the post-cold war world.²³ And if these professionals remained circumspect in their submissions, Liecester was more open about the socio-economic implications of

the new world order on the USA. He points out that the US military industrial establishment is so deeply integrated with the economy that any sudden reversal of policy, such as a cut on its defence budget, may spell dire consequences for the US economy, at least in the short term.

The previous emphasis on military power has left its mark on the US economy. Cold War strategy required America to develop a significant planned military-industrial sector, relying heavily for support on state procurement policies and political favouritism. The US recession which followed the rapid growth of the 1980's has been exacerbated in some states by an over dependence on military spending. The need for extensive economic restructuring was ignored as long as the cold war, and the spending to support it, tested."²⁴

Naturally it should be traumatic to the entire US economy to suggest streamlining the US military. Hegemonism becomes the short course to justifying continued military spending. No wonder, the Pentagon opinion favours US hegemonism, 'such as Chomsky points to.²⁵

Ironically, when it comes to Europe, especially NATO, even US public opinion does not favour abandonment.²⁶ At the crucial elite level, NATO becomes just a stepping stone to world dominance. Thus Sloan goes on to reason:

If the United States does not want to be the world's policeman but believes that its values and interest require the maintenance of a degree of order in the international system, it presumably will have to find a way to co-operate with other countries to police the system. When military actions are required, bilateral or multilateral co-operation can be ineffective or even dangerous if not planned and practiced in advance. But when one looks for nations with political objectives and military forces capable of operating successfully with the United States most of them are members of NATO.²⁷

But Europeans seem more and more to desire their separate identity, even in security matters. Such talk of a genuine

"European defence identify", as reported by Yves Doutriaux²⁸ is both indicative and suggestive. When one combines this with the drive towards political union of Europe, it becomes clear what apprehensions are entertained in Europe regarding USA's leadership role in the world. Indeed Europeans, (and perhaps Japanese too) prefer to think in terms of a multipolar, or at least a unimultipolar (to use Huntington's term) world in which the USA provides the "uni" (as leadership) but not as dominant power.²⁹ After giving a number of factors that at present erode America's power as a world leader (talk less of dominance)³⁰ Liecester concludes "that the US can no longer dominate, but there are significant obstacles in the way of its exercising effective leadership".

For the whole of the North, the South comes into reckoning only either as an imitating or embarrassing part of, the world. It is a region which holds much, of the world's natural resources, but one which cannot be trusted to make for the necessary peace, order and stability to allow the free flow of goods. It is a region that needs to be assisted (or forced) to imbibe North values - of democracy and the virtues of the market. Pierre Hassner sums up the North's views thus:

The -world is divided into two parts: one, that of the comparatively peaceful democracies, has become a security community or a peace zone, where war is no longer an instrument of politics the, other, consisting of the rest of the world, is hopelessly entangled in war, poverty and disorder resulting in anarchy or local or regional hegemonies.³²

That "rest of the world" largely corresponds to the South. And when Miller lists as one of the challenges facing the US in the new world order 'America's continued need for access to key resources and markets, it must be remembered that many, if not most, .of .these are obtainable mainly in the South, such as Petroleum and Uranium. But the North is uneasy with the North-South dichotomy that manifests in economic forms. At the same time advancement

in communications technology brings about an awareness that exacerbates discontent in the South. Howe notes;

The high standards of living communicated to developing nations, where the possibilities for similar realization are a long way off can create impatience and discontent.³⁴

And writing on the eve of the Soviet break-up, Vladimir Titov noted that Africa (a continent of the South) held over half of the world's natural resources of strategic minerals.³⁵ The same worries he observed of Africa's instability parallel those of older capitalism in West about the South.

On the map of, the global politics Africa is a continent oversaturated with distabilisation problem; in many respects it is the vulnerable, link without, which no positive change can be sufficiently strong or stable.

But the Soviet problem lay in "restructuring our commercial and economic cooperation with Africa on mutual benefit principles."³⁷

In broad terms the above represents the Russian perception of the South. In words capitalist Russia's view of South cannot be significantly different from the one by the rest of the North.

The Views from the South

We have referred to the fact that there are two perceptions of the world order in the South which we consider significant for their possible influence and implications. Clearly, there is a tone of regret in Ake's analysis of why there can be observed a 'disliking' between some economies of the South and the North.³⁸ The South Commission goes on to express similar sentiment:

It is quite unlikely the changes in East - West relations and within the countries of Eastern Europe... may cause the North to, divert attention and resources away from the South, at least in the short term. In the period immediately ahead, the South may well have to face a more homogenous and confident North preoccupied with its own problems and opportunities.³⁹

The question is: So what? The question only does not arise if we are not prepared to stand on our feet in the South. Again, Professor Ibrahim A. Gambari is reported to have expressed the same concern about the shifting of 'Big power attention' from the south, Africa, in this case).⁴⁰ That is the first viewpoint.

What we consider here to be the unenlightened viewpoint is not so well documented. But in recent times in Nigeria, it has become common to encounter civil servants and (not surprisingly 'businessman') talking about capitalism as the 'winner ideology', suggesting that it is the only option left if not the better. But even academics appear no less confused. Recently, in the lecture at the Benue State university, Makurdi, a colleague noted the triumph of capitalism upholding it as the only surviving ideology. What remained was what brand of capitalism Nigeria was to choose.⁴¹ The significance of his assumption is that the world is now safe for capitalism of every clime. And a student once asked me; 'with the demise of the Soviet Union, if not capitalism, what else?' This clearly illustrates the confusion. Such misreading of signals from the emergent international system that has overtaken the world since *glasnost and perestroika* is pregnant with dangers. Like in the first viewpoint from the South, it is capable of confounding policy. An uncritical embrace of capitalism leaves us in firmer grip of international monopoly capitalism without consideration of the due counsel of skepticism.

Domestically, it is patently an endorsement of the growing inhumanity that we have visited upon the masses in the name of development through capitalism among the Third World Countries. It takes the argument from the deprived to challenge the inhumanity of the system under operation. Failed socialism in the Soviet Union does not annul the intellectual worth of Marx's argument exposing the evils of capitalism. These viewpoints appear like a complex endangered by the dependency syndrome-looking North for our development and intellectual as well as policy guide.

Discussion and Conclusion

The danger implicit in the North perspective derives from arrogance and unbridled capitalist competition. While the former affects relations both between North and South and within the North itself, the latter affects relations with the North mainly. This latter could lead to a clash of the erstwhile North allies. Economic nationalism, as history shows, is the twin sister of capitalist competition. Competition amongst the super capitalists, i.e. the G-7, may heighten. Henry Kissinger once noted:

For one thing, the end of the cold war has liberated countries of the North from the major cause of their siege mentality and the fear that bound them together; admit, they collide in economic and political, competition which could take a dangerous turn.⁴² Given their technical capacity to conduct a contest, it should be the world's prayer that such a contest should never get violent. No doubt, Russia's embrace of market economy is a welcome ideological concession for world peace, for which they go down in history as the makers of this century having undertaken two revolutions that have each transformed the world. But within the group of seven (G-7), of which Russia has now attained an observer status membership there are apprehensions about Germany and Japan both of which on their part harbour grudges for the injuries suffered in recent history from the hands of the allies. Both capable and strong, they have been denied military establishments of their choosing a compromise on their sovereignties. Ironically, the two have emerged as economic giants for which they are envied. And Germany may be in the EEC and NATO, but her understanding with Russia cannot be reproduced with any other diplomatic partner - a factor of Eurasian geopolitics. It explains why Germany leads all in assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS), with attendant economic benefits. And proud Japan leads the world in economic achievements. These factors explain why they have remained subjects of suspicion and envy in the North. For a country like the USA, one can sympathize with the

depressing possibility of its seeing its future image in Britain. But the simple challenge seems to come to term with the reality of rivals in international leadership. She needs very sober reflections on this reality. To forge ahead with hegemonism is to court frustration and tragedy. There is a lesson to be learnt from this loaded statement once made by their very own Henry Kissinger.

We always tend to think of historical tragedy as failing to get what we want, but if we study history, we find that the worst tragedies have occurred when people got what they wanted...and it turned out to be the wrong objective.⁴³

The USA seems to need to live out this lesson. The fear in the North, often thinly veiled, seems to point to the USA constituting the danger in its overzealous triumphalism. If we must need the advice from Liecester, the US needs to be helped to transit from dominance to leadership of the world.⁴⁴

It appears also that the US needs to help the world to help her. Leadership of the present world demands that a higher level of civilization must be pursued. The contempt with which the North holds the South⁴⁵ is nothing novel except that it is a manifestation of the cruder forms of imperialism which appears rather anachronistic by now. It may be warned that the consequences of such attitude are clear; the South will resent the North in return. And if the world leadership cannot count on the cooperation of the resentful South, coercion becomes the cheap handmaid of world governance. This raises a dangerous spectre of violence, from the North to seek South's acquiescence, and from the South in revolt against the North. If Iraq is a metaphor for the Third World as seen by the North,⁴⁶ we cannot expect anything better for the future: for it is a manifestation of the structural problem of the world since the last half millenium - one of dominance and dependency which the world is not yet poised to redress. Closely related and similarly dangerous is the arrogant assumption of world cultural monism. For a plural world, such as the new consciousness accentuates, it is spurious for anyone to assume that

he reserves the right to determine standards, values and interests for all. It is this attitude of the North that fosters the logic for seeking to impose 'democracy' and human rights, which appear like the other names for market economy. Oily the danger of violent instability Head if we insist on imposing such a monism. Here too, *only* tolerance and accommodation of various cultures united in humanity, are a convincing way out.

The two viewpoints from the South have their dangerous policy implications. First, the fear of being abandoned is interpreted as meaning, losing the opportunity for development. For example, Ake talks of diffusing development: "If the new world order is ever going to be an improvement on its predecessor, it has to place highest priority on the diffusion of development." And who to do the diffusion? The North: "The North has the resources to help the South in a partnership in development..."⁴⁷ Plainly, this is a plea to the North to diffuse development to the South. But it should be known that development belongs to the same category of values with power. It is achieved or acquired (but never got by pleas) with some measure of ingenuity, dedication and hard work. Some parts of the North using power, forced the South to help develop them. The other (Japan) acquired it by cunning. If the leadership in the South is waiting for someone to develop the South, then we have not yet started. It means we have failed to correctly read the signals of the new world order. People are proclaiming the need of history, in Hegelian fashion.⁴⁸

Tragically, we did not proclaim the end of civilization when capitalism took over the reins of human affairs. We should be expecting too much of capitalism to anticipate enduring cooperation in the North, but least the diffusion of development, especially to the South. Miller has disputed the notion of end of history by arguing that, instead, in many places, history has only started or resumed. "Unfortunately, in many parts of the world, "History" has resumed with vengeance."⁴⁹ And Kissinger is reported to have claimed that history started in Moscow, moved

across to Bonn, to Washington and ended in Tokyo.⁵⁰ That is clearly North history. We should in the South perhaps start our history from Brasilia, moving to Abuja, Baghdad, through New Delhi and ending in Beijing. For the South, this is the only truly new world order to which we have a right on account of our size alone. Nobody can help those who cannot help themselves.

Also, the two viewpoints from the South seem to totally negate the fact that the new capitalism will be more competitive with the forces still directed at the South. For example, Russia may be economically poor, but with its technological leverage it can achieve faster industrialization with its new ideology affording it a reach to world markets and resources. Against the South, it stands to gain more favourable commercial terms. And Russia may be the new Japan of the future. It means more are recruited into the ranks of exploiters, even if yet potentially

On account of the second viewpoint from the south, one can imagine a piteous delegate from the South celebrating the triumph of capitalism at a world gathering assembled to discuss the future of the world - a ridiculous spectacle. But more seriously, such thinking only serves to obfuscate genuine intellectual efforts at true liberation and socio-economic advancement of the backward areas of the world - that is the south. Dependent capitalism, such as operated in the South, cannot accumulate enough wealth to bring about general development besides being socially 'oppressive of the mass of can only develop a few individuals, the very defenders of the status quo and perpetrators of tyranny in the name of law and order to achieve development. Besides, this viewpoint suffers from both intellectual and policy defects i.e. that man can only afford two socio-economic systems of socialism and capitalism. For the Third World, it remains a fact that capitalism least recommends itself as the means of achieving economic and social upliftment of the people, even if socialism has failed, courtesy of our dependent condition. We are better advised to accept the challenges of continued and sustained search for workable alternatives. Even

Russia still harbors a feeling for the third way." The operative word should be autonomy. And system.; by whatever name, adopted must operate autonomously, both internally and externally. It must not be imposed such as to resist and suppress the people's true desire and demands for adjustments. Samir Amin recommends delinking.⁵² If we could not undertake that deliberately, the opportunity has offered itself to delink. We should not be seen to be complaining. At international level, collective action and institutionalization of cooperation remain open and inviting options for the South.

The future of the world hangs in a delicate balance between a higher level of human civilization accepting that we are all, in our varied backgrounds and conditions, worth the life on this planet and the crudity excusable on human nature. It must be a future world that has room for the strong as for the weak; one in which the feelings and views of the weak will be taken seriously; but not one in which the strong must always have their way. It was William Blake who said: "One law for the lion and the lamb is oppression."

Notes

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2. Olga, Alexandrova, reports of Russia's independent Third World Policy despite her cooperation with the West. It worries the North. See p. 246 especially for his "Third World in Russian Foreign Policy," *Aussen Politik: German Foreign Affairs Review*, 31" Quarter, 1996 (English Edition).
3. Li Pen draws our attention to *the* fact that the advanced world has clashes of interests, especially in economic spheres. See *The Guardian*. 28th March, 1988, p.5. The fact is corroborated by Claude Ake. *The New World Order. A View from the South*, (Lagos: Malthouse Press Ltd, 1992) See pp. 15,27-3 1.

4. See for example, the South Commission. *The Challenge of the South: The Report of the South Commission* (Oxford University Press, 1990) and Ake Op. Cit.
5. Kegley, Op. Cit
6. Ibid indeed Kegley uses the term neolaudism.
7. The South Commission, Op. Cit
8. Subramayam, K: "Political Scenario", in Waslekar, (ed) *The New World Order*. (Delhi: Konark Publishers Pvt Ltd. 1991) P.14.
9. Ibid p. 15.
10. De Cueller, Javier Perez, "Introduction," in Waslekar, Ibid, p.6
11. Ibid, p. 5.
12. See *Daily Times*, 19th February, 1990. "Tales of the Unexpected", p. 10
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14. Chomsky, Noam, "World Orders, Old and New", in *The South Centre*, Ibid.
15. Leicester, Graham, "From Dominance to Leadership: America's Place in the World", *The Political Quarterly*, Volume 67, Number 1,1996.
16. Ibid, See especially p. 37.
17. Chomsky, Op cit. P. 141.
18. Ibid. P. 142
19. Miller, Paul David (Admiral) "In the Absence of War: Employing America's Military Capabilities in the 1990's," *The Fletcher Forum*, volume 198, Number 1. Winter Spring, 1994 p. p5.
20. Ibid. P.I

21. Howe, Jonathan T. (Admiral ret), "Will America lead a New World Order?" *The Fletcher Forum*, Volume 18, Number 1, Winter 'Spring. 1994.
22. Leicester, Op. cit. P. 36.
23. See *The Fletcher Forum* Volume 18, Number 1, 1994.
24. Leicester, Op. Cit see note 16 above.
25. Chomsky, Op. Cit See note 14 above.
26. Sloan, Stanley R. "US Perspectives on NATO's Future," *International Affairs*, Volume 71, Number 2, April 1995. He reports a poll conducted in 1994 which showed 73% of the US Public favoured her continued remain in NATO. SEE p. 221.
27. Ibid, p.227.
28. See *Label France*, September, 1996, Number 25, p. 19
29. See Leicester, op. Cit. P. 38
30. Ibid, p. 41
31. Ibid, p. 42
32. Hassner, Pierre, "Beyond the Three Traditions: The Philosophy of War and Peace in Historical Perspective", *International Affairs*, Volume 70, Number 4, April 1995 p. 379.
33. Mil le r Op. Cit P.7
34. Hows, op cit P. 24
35. Titov, Vladimir, "Africa in the Post Confrontation World in the making," *International Affairs*, August, 1991.p.6
36. Ibid, P.7
37. Ake, op. Cit op. 52-3.
38. South Commission, op. Ch. P. 158.
39. Cited by Asobfe, H. Asisi, "Conceptualizing the Configuration of Forces in the Emerging Inter national System: Contending Perspectives" in *Nigerian Journal of International Affairs*, Volume 19, Number 1,1993, pp. 2-3.
40. Anger, Barnabas, on further expatiation of point B of his recommendations in a paper titled "Political Elite and the Future of Democracy in Nigeria", Presented at the inauguration and swearing-in of officials of the National

Association of Political Science Students (NAPSS), Benue State University, Makurdi Chapter, 25th Jury, 1997. (Unpublished).

41. See Ake, op. Cit. P. 27

42. Kissinger, Henry, *For the Record; Selected Statements*, 1977-1980. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 11981), p. 158.

43. Leicester, op. Cit

44. Ake, Op eft pp. 19-20.

45. Ptaff cited in Ake, Ibid, p. 21; also similar reference is made to Iraq by Howe, op. Cit pp.25-26.

46. Ake, ibid, p. 51

47. Francis Fukuyama, cited in Hassner, op. Cit P. 252.

48. Miller, op.cit. p. 21

49. Ake, Op cit P. 20

50. Olga, op. Cit see. P. 246.

51. Amin, Samir, "The Challenge of Globization: Delinking ", in *The South Centre*, op. Cit.